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D

uring the period of early history, through the Biblical days, the Egyptian,
Greek, and Roman empires, and the Crusades, and well into the Middle
Ages, there was no protection for individuals taken prisoner in conflict and they
were either killed or enslaved. It was not until well into the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries that it began to be accepted that prisoners of war were
merely unfortunate human beings who were being held in custody solely to
prevent them from once again engaging in the hostilities.! While this resulted
in some bilateral agreements touching on the subject, the first multilateral
attempt to legislate in this area was Chapter II of the Regulations Attached to
the 1899 Hague Convention No. II on the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, 2
a document containing 17 articles with respect to prisoners of war. The 17
articles of Chapter II of the Regulations Attached to the 1907 Hague
3
Convention No. IV on the Laws and Customs of War on Land were, for all
practical purposes, identical to those of 1899. The provision of these two
instruments most relevant to our discussion is Article 4(2) which provides that:
"They [i.e., prisoners of war] must be humanely treated." Although these
Conventions had no penal provisions as such, after both World War I and World
War II individuals were tried and convicted for what amounted to violations of
.
..
4
thelr provlSlons.
During the course of World War I the provisions of the 1907 Hague IV
Convention relating to the protection of prisoners of war were found to be so
inadequate that a great number of bilateral and multilateral agreements on the
5
subject were drafted and entered into by the opposing belligerents. Then in
1929, as an aftermath of World War I, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (the ICRC), which had previously been concerned solely with the sick
and wounded of armed forces in the field and at sea, entered the prisoner-of-war
arena by sponsoring the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War6; and World War II was followed by four new
ICRC-sponsored conventions, the third of which was the 1949 Geneva
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Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 7 It is with this 1949
Third Geneva Convention that we will be primarily concerned. 8 In view of the
breadth of the subject-matters covered by the 1949 Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, this discussion will be limited
to the provisions relevant to "deterring humanitarian law violations" and to
· enfcorcement" 0 fh
..
9
th ose " strength
enmg
t ose provlSlons.
First, some statistics: as of31 December 1995 there were 185 members of the
United Nations. At that same time, there were 186 States Parties to the 1949
Geneva Conventions. The only members of the United Nations, or Parties to
the Statute of the International Court ofJustice, who were not Parties to these
Conventions were Eritrea, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, and Nauru. 10 The near
universality of these conventions is obvious and it is probably not an exaggeration
to say that they are now part of the customary law of war, binding on all nations,
whether or not they are Parties thereto.
There are a number of articles of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention which
are worthy of mention in the context of our study as they establish either the
coverage of the Convention or the substantive humanitarian rule which is to be
followed. Thus, Article 1 is short and to the point: "The High Contracting
Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention
in all circumstances." Note that not only does a Party itself undertake to respect
the provisions of the Convention, it is responsible for ensuring respect thereof
by its people, civilian and military, and by other Parties, including the belligerents
when it is a neutral and its allies when it is a co-belligerent. This latter is not
always an easy task, as the United States learned in Vietnam.
Article 2 specifies when the Convention is applicable. First, it is applicable
in all cases of declared war or ofany other anned conflict which may arise between

two or more of the High Contracting Parties even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of themY
The latter part of this provision has increased in importance because of the
fact that although there have been more than a hundred international armed
conflicts since the end of World War II, there have been no declarations of war
since that of the Soviet Union against Japan in August 1945 and there have,
therefore, been no formal acts recognizing the existence of a state of war.
Second, the Convention is applicable in the case of a military occupation,
even if that occupation is not resisted; and, third, the general participation (si
omnes) clause of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions is specifically rejected
and the Convention is applicable as between States Parties thereto even if one
of the belligerents is not a Party to the Convention. In view of the \vide
acceptance of this Convention, this provision, which was of major importance
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when adopted, hasJost that status. Its importance when drafted is evidenced by
the fact that in his 1948 dissent in the trial of the major Japanese war criminals
by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,Justice Pal ofIndia found
that during World War II in the Pacific Japan was not bound by the rules set
forth in the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV and its annexed Regulations
12
because Bulgaria and Italy were not Parties to that Convention.
Article 4 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention is an extremely lengthy
article which specifies the numerous classes of individuals who are entided to
prisoner-of-war status when they fall into the power of the enemy. For the
purposes of the present study it may be assumed that at the time of the alleged
violation of the humanitarian provisions of the Convention the victims were
prisoners of war and that at the time of the prosecution for that alleged violation
of the humanitarian provisions of the Convention, the accused were entided to
the status of prisoners of war. 13
Article 5 has two very important provisions. Its first paragraph provides that
the Convention is applicable "from the time they [i.e., persons entided to
prisoner-of-war status] fall into the power of the enemy until their final release
and repatriation." The North Koreans and the Chinese Communists in Korea
contended that a prisoner of war was not entided to the benefits of the
Convention until he had "repented"-which meant that he had accepted
Communist indoctrination14; and the North Vietnamese contended that,
although no American prisoners of war had been tried, they were all war
criminals captured in flagrante delido and, therefore, were not entided to the
1S
protection of the Convention. Neither of these contentions was legally valid.
Moreover, the second paragraph of that article specifically provides that if there
is a dispute as to the entidement to prisoner-of-war status, the individual is
entided to the protection of the provisions of the Convention until his status
has been determined by a competent tribunal. No such determinations were
made in either North Korea or North Vietnam, but prisoners of war held by
16
those entities were denied the protection of the provisions of the Convention.
Article 8 is concerned with the operations of the Protecting Power, the
neutral Power which represents a belligerent in the territory of its enemy and
which has the very important responsibility of ensuring that prisoners of war
receive the humane treatment and other protections to which they are entided
under the provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention. A Protecting
Power is selected by the belligerent which it is to represent and it must be
acceptable to the belligerent in whose territory it is to operate. While most
belligerents had Protecting Powers during World War II, the 1982 Falklands
War is the only real instance of the designation, acceptance, and functioning of
Protecting Powers during hostilities since 1949 despite the great number of
17
international wars which have occurred since that time. This is, indeed, a
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tragedy, as the mere existence of a Protecting Power is frequently sufficient to
ensure more humane treatment for prisoners of war.
Article 9 provides that nothing in the Convention is to be considered as
adversely affecting the humanitarian activities of the ICRC, or of any other
impartial humanitarian organization, which activities are, however, subject to
the consent of the belligerent concerned. In Korea the ICRC was allowed to
perform its normal functions of inspecting prisoner-of-war camps, consulting
individual prisoners ofwar, providing relief supplies, etc., by the United Nations
Command in South Korea, but it was not permitted to function in North Korea.
In Vietnam the ICRC was allowed to perform its normal functions in South
Vietnam, but it was not permitted to function in North Vietnam. During the
hostilities in Vietnam one well-known academic took the position that an
anti-war group of which he was a member was such an "impartial humanitarian
,organization. ,,18 The present author strongly challenged that conclusion. 19
During the Iran-Iraq War there were not only no Protecting Powers, but both
countries frequently denied the International Committee of the Red Cross
access to its prisoner-of-war camps. Eventually, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations sent a special mission to inspect the prisoner-of-war camps in
both countries and numerous violations of the provisions of the 1949 Third
20
Geneva Convention were found to have been committed by both sides.
The 1949 Third Geneva Convention contains a number of substantive
provisions which define certain inhumane conduct towards prisoners of war as
punishable. Thus, Article 13 provides:
Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously
endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is rrohibited and will
be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. 1 In particular, no
prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific
experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital
.
. d out m
. his Interest.
.
22
treatment 0 fth e pnsoner
concerned and came
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts
of violence and against insults and public curiosity.23
Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.24
And Article 130 states:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any
of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the
Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
compelling a prisoner ofwar to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully
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depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this
Convention?5

These two articles refer specifically to serious or grave breaches of the
provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention.16 Article 129(1) of that
Convention requires States Party "to enact legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed,
any of the grave breaches" defined in Article 130. Based upon the precedents
of post-World War II, this provision was unnecessary. A violation of a
prohibitive provision of a law-of-war convention is a war crime; a war crime is
punishable as a violation of international law; the punishment to be assessed for
27
the commission ofa war crime is within the discretion of the trial court. Article
129(3) requires each State Party to take measures for the punishment of all
violations of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention other than the grave breaches.
Thus, violations of other provisions of the Convention such as, for example,
those contained in Articles 14, 16, 17,23,26,34,52, etc., are likewise punishable
offenses, although the international community considers them to be on a lesser
level of importance than violations of the provisions of Articles 13 and 130.18
There will be little difficulty in identifying the acts which constitute violations
of the substantive provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention.
Unfortunately, the procedural provisions of that Convention, while easily
identified, may present some problems of application.
Articles 82-88 and 99-107 set forth rules which are intended to ensure that
any prisoner of war who is subjected to a judicial proceeding by the Detaining
Power, whether for a pre-capture or a post-capture offense, will receive a fair
trial. Most of those provisions should cause no difficulty of implementation. 29
However, there are two which will.
Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention provided:
A sentence shall only be pronounced on a prisoner of war by the same tribunals
and in accordance with the same procedure as in the case of persons belonging to
the anned forces of the detaining Power.
30

In the Yamashita Case the United States Supreme Court held that this
provision was directed at post-capture offenses only and did not apply to trials
for pre-capture offenses (war crimes). This ruling was followed by all of the
courts before which the issue was raised in the war crimes cases tried after World
War II with the result that those cases were not tried by courts-martial, but by
military tribunals, military commissions, and other specially established courts,
each with its own rules concerning procedure and, particularly, the admission
o f eVl·dence. 31
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Apparendy the participants in the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the
1949 Third Geneva Convention desired to make its provisions applicable to
pre-capture, as well as post-capture, offenses. To accomplish this end they
included in that Convention Article 102 which, for all practical purposes, is
identical with Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention; then
they drafted a new provision to be found in Article 85 of the 1949 Third Geneva
Convention, which states:
Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts
committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the
. 32
present C onventJ.on.

It would appear that the draftsmen were attempting to provide that when
prisoners of war are tried for pre-capture offenses, that is, for war crimes, they
would, in accordance with the provisions of Article 102, be entided to be tried
"by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members
of the armed forces of the Detaining Power"-which means that the draftsmen
of the Convention were adopting a rule contrary to that laid down in the
Yamashita Case?3 Of course, such trials could still be conducted by military
commissions or other specially created tribunals-but only if members of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power could be tried by such commissions or
tn·bunals. 34
There is one possible view of Article 85 of the 1949 Third Geneva
Convention which might result in its being interpreted differendy. As we have
seen, that article refers to prisoners of war "prosecuted under the laws of the
Detaining Power." When a prosecution is for a violation of a provision of the
1949 Third Geneva Convention, is it based on "the laws of the Detaining
Power" or is it based on international law? The International Committee of the
Red Cross urges very strongly that such a prosecution is based on national law,
particularly for a country like the United States where treaties are part of the
35
supreme law of the land. On the other hand, it is often argued: (1) that the
post-World War II war crimes trials established the precedent that war crimes
were and are violations of international law; (2) that it would be difficult to find
a national statute which, for example, prohibited compelling a prisoner of war
to serve in the forces of the Capturing Power, or the denial of quarter, or the
use of prisoner-of-war labor in a munitions factory; and (3) that the fact that
Article 99 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention prohibits the trial of a prisoner
of war for an act not "forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by
International Law,,,36 while Article 85 of that Convention refers only to "the
laws of the Detaining Power," indicates that the draftsmen did not intend
prosecutions under international law to be covered by the provisions of Article
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85 and that, therefore, the decision in the Yamashita Case, and like cases,
continues to apply. This appears to be a problem of interpretation which will
only be resolved when courts are actually presented with the problem?7
It is apparent that in any future war crimes trials there will be little opportunity
to advance the contention that the offense charged is subject to the claim of
being ex post facto; and that, under the post-war situation which normally
prevails, prosecutions in common law countries will be much more difficult to
conduct if there must be compliance with the strict common law rules of
evidence. However, all in all, it may certainly be said that while some of the
provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention are intended to protect the
helpless prisoner of war from unfair prosecutions, the specific aim of many of
those provisions is to "deter humanitarian law violations" and to "strengthen
enforcement" of the substantive provisions thereo£
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